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Abstract: - The paper aims at discovering the role of the auditors in the italian listed companies, by proposing 
an updated conceptualization of the existing literature. In this way, the adoption of a qualitative methodology 
allows for the construction of a literature analysis on the role of the auditors in the italian listed companies. As 
source for the analysis the databases of the Italian Stock Exchange, Consob and the Code of Conduct, as well as 
the governance proposals by ENI, were consulted. Moreover, the research uses secondary sources and includes 
documents, papers and scientific books and databases.  
 
Key-Words: - corporate governance, auditors, audit, listed companies, Consob, Italian Stock Exchange 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the role of the auditors in 
Italian listed companies, proposing an update 
conceptualization of the existing literature.  
In this context, the objective of the paper is to define 
the figure appointed as coordinator of the auditing 
activity in the corporate governance perspective [3] 
[12] [20] [23] in order to achieve the objective of 
the transparency and simplification. 
The present work is the result of a research carried 
out on models of governance [25] adopted by the 
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. 
Such observation enabled the analysis of these 
models, and, most importantly, of the roles taken by 
the different auditors. Particularly, on the base of the 
indications coming from the legal auditing matter 
laws, it was possible to detect a radical change of 
the auditing role. The reference set of rules is often 
contradictory and does not clearly reveal which 
controller, between the various involved, is the one 
appointed to synthesize the various "core" of the 
control activity. Therefore, as resulting  from the 
Italian Stock Exchange data, from the new internal 
orders coming from the Code of Conduct and the 
proposals about the governance matter carried out 
by ENI, this work proceeded to check the state of 
the art and possible solutions already used from the 
major listed groups. All this is intended to 
understand which figure appointed as coordinator of 
the auditing activity, in order to achieve the double 
objective of transparency and simplification. 
The research uses a qualitative method [24]. As 
source for the analysis the databases of the Italian 
Stock Exchange, Consob and the Code of Conduct, 
as well as the governance proposals by ENI, were 
consulted. Moreover, the research uses secondary 
sources and includes documents, papers and 
scientific books and databases.  
The research adopts an exploratory approach and 
has the purpose of filling the gaps in literature 
declaring the role of the auditors in the Italian listed 
companies. 
The paper is structured as follows. After the 
introduction, the second section presents the 
corporate governance models. The methodology and 
approach are described in the third sector. The 
findings are set out in the fourth section, together 
with the implications of the research. The fifth 
section contains the discussions, conclusions, 
limitations of the study, together with a number of 
suggestions for future research. 
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The research question to be asked is the following:  
Q1: Which is the role of the auditors in the Italian 
listed companies? 
 
 
2 The corporate governance 
models and their practical application    
The delicate issue of corporate audits requires 
careful examination, during the last few months, in 
fact, the spreading crisis of the economy has put into 
question the need for control [22]. Rules such as the 
one of the single auditor , for the purpose of 
simplification, the role and the quality of the 
auditing activity itself. 
Auditing must be an investment, rather than a cost, 
for the corporation, by granting: 
• transparency of management; 
• transparency in asset, economic and financial 
values; 
• transparency in internal and external relationships; 
• transparency towards funders; 
• transparency towards current and potential 
investors; 
• transparency towards the Public Administration. 
Transparency means guarantee [27] and this 
demands an added value for the company [11]. The 
auditing activity should take place with effectual 
purpose. It is pointless to demand for an audit while 
creating the circumstances that turn it into being 
inappropriate. Auditing must not be only a pointless 
catch-phrase, it should be the achievement of an 
effective and efficient application. This means that 
the control on the one hand must not be superficial 
and on the other does not even have to be oversized, 
in fact being oversized would result in the absence 
of the control itself. So today, more than ever, it 
seems necessary to implement a cross covering 
auditing activity that would apply to different 
strategic areas, but that does not stratify to the point 
of being useless. 
An important issue is the need to reconcile the 
auditing with the control. From the operating point 
of view, in fact, many "managers" consider auditing 
as a diminutio of their freedom of decision, not 
understanding the added value of transparent 
management and the of the possible synergies with 
the auditing part. It should also be recalled that 
currently the scenery of the audits is diversified and 
changes along with the governance model, with the 
size of the company and the business sector  to 
which it belongs. This often "annoys" the 
management, which claims to be undergoing 
unnecessary and often harmful costs. 
On the one hand, therefore, there is a need for the 
culture of control, on the other hand the audits must 
not be too invasive or oversized [17]. 
The models of governance [28], [31] contemplate 
the listed above requirements and should be its legal 
configuration, as well as the appropriate governance 
structure, carries out an important strategic choice. 
Today, this choice must consider different 
conflicting interests. First of all, the economic entity 
that needs to pursue, through the management, its 
own aims. Then there are the investors - minority 
shareholders and potential investors - that aim to 
control and to know the corporate action. Then the 
creditors who need to understand company's 
performance and to monitor the assets on which to 
rely for the fulfillment of their claims. Finally there 
are the workers who have the right to be aware of 
the trend of the management and, within certain 
limits, to take part in the choices of the company. 
There are, then, the various Authorities who need 
information and guarantees of transparency. In this 
regard, the governance model is crucial for the 
composition of the various stakeholders interest and, 
last but not least, to allow the company to compete 
effectively in the market. 
Following such assumption, the analysis focuses on 
listed companies which, although not representing a 
significant sample from the numerical point of view 
[29], [30], are those on which encumber “charges 
for information" in the biggest amount and in which, 
quite often, there is a significant overlap between 
"controllers". 
The models currently contemplated under national 
law are three: the traditional, the two-tier and the 
one-tier model. 
The traditional model entrusts (following the art. 
2380 Civil Code) the administration to a board of 
directors (or a sole director) and the auditing activity 
to the board of auditors. Both are an expression of 
the shareholders assembly. 
The in-word model demands that the economic 
entity [7], [9] manages the business directly or by 
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appointing chosen persons (Is that subject able to 
"manage" the company directly or by exerting its 
influence over the appointment of managing entities 
of its trust). The logic is to have a governing organ 
that acts in order to satisfy the property interests, 
while there is a monitoring organ that must watch 
over the work of the governing organ in order to 
protect the company and the shareholders interests, 
being expression both of the economic entity and of 
the minority. To achieve such target, this auditor 
must be independent. In fact, only the independence 
allows to protect all stakeholders and not just the 
minority shareholders but also all the other subjects 
of the business: creditors, employees, government, 
etc. 
The one-tier system  foresees that the assembly 
appoints the administrators, which is responsible for 
the operational management of the company, the 
administrators themselves will have to appoint a 
committee of management auditing. The assembly 
also provides for the appointment of an external 
auditor who is entrusted with the accounting 
auditing (the use of an auditing firm is compulsory 
for all those companies that make use of the "market 
risk capital", defined, as already mentioned, in the 
art. 116 of  Legislative Decree no. 58/1998.). The 
peculiarity of the model lies in the one-tier body, 
appointed by the assembly, who is entrusted with 
the tasks of management and auditing [21]. This 
implies that the auditing committee is the emanation 
of the controlled entities themselves (the board). 
The mixture of management and control as 
expression of a single body, leaves doubts about the 
effective operation of the governance . To weaken 
the effects of this risk, more stringent criteria of 
professionalism and independence of the board have 
been pursued. The risks within the model 
concerning the lack of impartiality are evident and 
can be overcome only with the explicit request of 
professionalism and independence. 
The two-tier system contemplates that the auditor is 
appointed by the assembly, while the management is 
appointed directly by the same auditor. The 
assembly also provides for the appointment of an 
external auditor (also in this case the use of an audit 
firm is required in cases where the company has 
resorted to the "market risk capital" within the 
meaning given to that expression by art. 116 of 
Legislative Decree 58/98 and its implementing 
regulation). 
The members of the Management Board, members 
or non-members, have the task of managing the 
company. The Supervisory Board watches over the 
management company and verifies the adequacy, 
the effective and proper functioning of the 
organizational and administrative-accounting 
systems. These functions are adapted from the 
similar ones of the board of auditors in the 
traditional model. To the Supervisory Board belong 
functions typical of the assembly such as the 
approval of the budget, the appointment, the 
removal and replacement of members of the 
management board, it is enabled to promote legal 
action towards the members of the management 
board. 
The two-tier model has been designed in order to 
limit the interference of "ownership" in business 
management, but also to identify in the supervisory 
board the authority charged with putting together, in 
advance, different and, not infrequently, opposed 
interests in order to facilitate the management task 
of the Board of Management. The application of this 
model made by the legislature deviate from this 
paradigm, resulting thus poorly efficient as it 
determines, if not properly defined, conflict between 
those who manage and those who control and lack 
of clarity concerning roles and responsibilities. 
Starting from the examination above, it is clear that 
the models currently present in our law system have 
features that are not always compatible with the 
actual Italian entrepreneurial situation. Not by 
chance the so-called alternative models of 
governance have found poor application in Italy; on 
December 31st 2011 only 10 listed companies have 
adopted alternative models and, specifically, 3 
adopted the one-tier and 7 the two-tier (CONSOB, 
2012) . This leads to the conclusion that the listed 
companies believe is appropriate to trust in the 
traditional model. Therefore, the analysis focused, 
as already noted, on that model. 
 
 
3 Research Approach 
The method used for research is qualitative, with an 
exploratory approach, proposing to the academic 
community and to policy makers, an updated 
conceptualization of the auditors’ role in the Italian 
listed companies.  
Analysis of this topic integrates and updates existing 
literature, allowing for the definition of key aspects 
of the auditors role in the corporate governance 
system.  
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The research uses a qualitative method [24]. As 
source for the analysis the databases of the Italian 
Stock Exchange, Consob and the Code of Conduct, 
as well as the governance proposals by ENI, were 
consulted. Moreover, the research uses secondary 
sources and includes documents, papers and 
scientific books and databases.  
The research adopts an exploratory approach and 
has the purpose of filling the gaps in literature 
declaring the role of the auditors in the Italian listed 
companies. 
 
 
4. Internal audits in listed companies 
The modern concept of the internal audits gravitates 
around the notion of business risks, around their 
identification, assessment and monitoring, it is also 
for this reason that the legislation and the Code of 
Conduct  refers to the system of internal audit and 
risk management as a unit system where the risk is 
the common thread. 
It is necessary not to forget that the company must 
manage its business risks, after having mapped 
them. From here will descend the procedures and, 
by consequence, the audits. A control system to be 
effective, must be "integrated": this implies that its 
components are mutually connected and 
interdependent and that the system as a whole, is 
itself integrated into the general organizational, 
administrative and accounting structure of the  
corporation. 
Is up to the board of directors (Italian Stock 
Exchange, 2011) , being the strategic supervising 
body, to absolve the task of defining the guidelines 
for the auditing system, consistent with the risk 
profile of the company as determined by the board 
of directors [4], [16]. The Board is also responsible, 
in accordance with law previsions, for the 
assessment of the adequacy of the audits. This 
assessment is carried out periodically, but, in case of 
unexpected events occurring within the corporate 
life, may be required extraordinary insights, aimed 
at testing the effectiveness of audits relating to 
particular situations. Performing these tasks, as well 
as for the examination of periodic financial reports, 
the Board requires an adequate inquest activity. This 
activity, in listed companies, is typically carried out 
by a committee of directors, "control and risk 
committee" [6], [14] [26].  
In the perspective of streamlining the governance 
structures, the Board of Directors may decide to 
carry out the mentioned inquests directly, i.e. 
without the setting-up of a special committee, where 
such a choice is consistent with the characteristics of 
the company. 
There are several main functions involved in the 
governance of the auditing system. Crucial 
importance is detained by the internal auditing 
function (or internal review), invested of the "third 
level" auditing activity. The internal audit function 
is strongly characterized from independence, which 
explicates both through the attribution of 
autonomous powers concerning the initiative in the 
predisposition of the auditing plan and activation of 
single interventions, either through the procedures 
previously established for the appointment, 
dismissal and remuneration of its responsible. 
The powers proper of the Board of directors 
concerning the auditing activity denote the existence 
of a real hierarchical relationship with the head of 
the internal audit function. In any case, it is 
necessary that decisions regarding the matters above 
mentioned are taken with the approval of the control 
and risk committee (or, as alternative, of the 
remuneration committee, limitedly only to the 
proposals relating to the remuneration) and having 
consulted the board . Particular attention must be 
paid to the information flows generated by the 
internal audit function: the results of the audits 
should be transmitted, at the same time, to the 
chairmen of the board of directors, of auditors, of 
the control and risk committee and to the 
administrator accountable for the system of internal 
audits and of risk management, underlining that this 
accountable cannot receive  any anticipated 
communication regarding the job done. 
Are placed on a different level the corporate 
functions holding the so-called "second-level" 
auditing tasks, those  aimed to monitor and manage 
business-related risks, such as operational risk, 
financial risk, market risk, the risk of (non) 
conformity, etc. Excluding the figure of the manager 
in charge for compiling accounting documents, 
which is by law responsible to predispose adequate 
administrative and accounting procedures for the 
composition of the financial informative documents, 
there are not general provisions applicable to all 
companies regardless of sector, in terms of risk 
management. Conversely, certain sectoral 
regulations provide for the establishment of specific 
structures or corporate roles appointed to manage 
risk, such as the chief risk officer, the compliance 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS Maria Teresa Bianchi
E-ISSN: 2224-2899 158 Volume 14, 2017
function, a risk committee, made up of managers 
and put in charge in order to assist in the in the risk 
assessment process the social parts. In the scope of a 
rationalization of the auditing system, the 
companies consider the opportunity to assign the 
auditors the functions of Supervisory Body of the 
Legislative Decree. No. 231/2001. 
The board of Auditors recovers a central role on the 
supervision system of a company. The board of 
Auditors has the duty ensures in advance and not 
only ex post, this for controlling the processes of 
which result has to be known by the administrator. 
In order to adopt any necessary corrective actions. 
All this it’s important also for controlling 
reputational risks, which are under observation 
expecially by banks and financial companies.  [1], 
[2] [5], [10] [18], [19].  
The resulting coordination with the organs of 
management, including delegates, is intended to be 
compatible with the role of monitoring the 
compliance (to the rules, to the statute, to the 
internal procedures), typically entrusted to the 
Board of Auditors, which distinguishes it clearly 
from the Board of directors and the audit committee 
and risks, all of which play the role of evaluation 
(also about the merit) upon the adequacy of the 
structures and the trend of the management. 
Within the Board of Auditors stands out the role of 
the president, which is responsible of coordinating 
the works of this organ and of the connection with 
other corporate organs involved in the governance 
of the auditing systems. The fact that the chairman 
of the board of auditors role is reserved to a member 
elected by the minority shareholders introduces a 
further element of impartiality that can increase the 
guarantees of independence, but should not be 
intended as an element of estrangement from the 
corporate organization: the board of auditors is an 
organ that operates from the inside of the company 
and in coordination with the management organs, in 
order to achieve its primary goal of creating value 
for shareholders in the medium-long term 
perspective. 
A constant exchange of information is essential 
between the auditors and the organs and functions 
within the company that absolve tasks concerning 
internal auditing. 
The need for an action by the auditing board 
observant to the decisions of the top management, 
as well as a coordinating role of the auditing 
functions, starting from the most operating within 
the company. Coordination contemplates meetings 
of the board involving the functions of internal 
audit, compliance, coordinator of the Supervisory 
Board (ex Decree 231/2001), if there is risk 
manager, in addition to the external auditors. 
Attention of the board must be directed to the 
procedures, whose control and update must be 
highlighted in the plans of auditing and during the 
monitoring of their effective execution. To tell the 
truth, most of the provided colleges follow the 
practice above indicated. 
 
5 Discussion, Conclusions and 
future research                                                 
From the outcome of the analysis led and of the 
Italian Stock exchange and CONSOB data is clear 
that an efficient governance is the one that best 
meets the needs of the company organization. So, 
the model has to be customized for the specific 
company. If the activity is restricted there can be 
also a monocratic authority, or even there can not be 
auditing authority, because, de facto, the audit is 
exercised by the economic subject that makes the 
internal audit for technical-operational and legal 
purposes, but when the dimension and, so, the 
stakeholders increase in number the behaviour 
changes and the internal and legal audit can no be 
longer exercised by a single authority, it is 
necessary to separate the two functions. These both 
have to be exercised with strictness, transparency 
and professionalism. The collegiality is a necessary 
element, of course it is not enough, but it is 
necessary to ensure such characteristics. 
The audit system represents one of the crucial 
feature of the company governance, as it is clear by 
the reading of the Conduct Code of Italian stock 
exchange. Its components are very diversified and 
they are represented by “first levels auditing”, so-
called, made by operating managers, to, so-called, 
management auditing, concerning the planning and 
the corporate business audit, until internal audit, 
meaning the activity of general control on structure 
and functionality of internal audit. It is clear that the 
company dimension supposes different models of 
coordination between management and audit. The 
choice of government model has to be made 
considering the features of the company, of the 
property, of the leadership type,  of the direction 
type, as well as, obviously, of the model internal 
feature.. 
The audit in the micro company is, normally, an 
audit not formalized, exercised by the same 
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entrepreneur. This one doesn’t want give 
information about its own activity and about its own 
choices. The moment and the way to inform about 
his own work results in the balance sheet (if draft 
up) and in the tax return. These documents are 
shown, mostly, at the revenue authority and at the 
banks. 
In cases, such as those described, it is clear that the 
need of the audit is exercised from the within and 
there isn’t a borderline between governance and 
management. It is sufficient, however, that the size 
of the company increases also a bit and so the need 
of audit is amplified. The audit becomes an 
organizational need and it is imposed by the chosen 
model of management. The audit, so, is exercised at 
the level: of management audit, of the internal 
auditing, of the technical-administrative procedures, 
of the balance sheet, of the correct application of the 
procedures, of the principle and of  the rules. 
It’s evident in the operation, but perhaps that isn’t 
very explicit in the governance principles, and 
namely that the board of auditors is the centre of the 
audit activity whit the tasks of coordination and 
support structure. To achieve this hypothesis is 
necessary have unique rules that make this activity 
clear, while now it is only sketched. So the elements 
to be monitored in order to have an effective audit 
are: 
• A) risk analysis; 
• B) establishment of procedures; 
• C) allocations of tasks to the corporate 
bodies and functions; 
• D) coordination and integration of the audits 
in the hands of the committee in charge for this (the 
board of auditors in the traditional model). 
The auditing without a right coordination turns out 
to be inefficient. In fact, there is the necessity to 
have a coordinator, that, having experience and 
skills, make the audit an embedded system and, so, 
in synergism with the usefulness for senior 
managers. 
In this way, the multiple regulatory actions is 
interpreted in the matter of audit  having changed, 
de facto, the board of auditors in the coordinator of 
the audit and of the controllers. The role of the 
auditor lost its original function statutory auditor to 
take on more and more the one of controller of the 
administration, seen as especially as monitoring the 
adequacy of the organizational, administrative and 
accounting structure of the company. 
It is significant the extension of the duty of the 
board of auditors, in  addition to s.r.l. with capital 
equal to o greater than € 120.000, to the s.r.l. that 
exceed the quantitative limits of the 2435-bis and 
that monitor a public interest company  (listed 
company) or a company subject to a mandatory 
auditor or obliged to the consolidated. The presence 
of an authority of audit in the more complicated 
business background ensures the protection of the 
transparency and fairness of the management. 
The legislation about the board of auditors 
identified, so, an authority more engaged in the firm 
to coordinate the controllers , with features of 
professionalism, independence and integrity clearly 
identified [8].  
Nowadays the coordination of the audit appears 
more than ever the actual item on which is based the 
match of audit effectiveness and efficiency. 
In this way, it’s right to read the proposals made by 
important Italian listed group that change the own 
model of corporate governance according to the 
business needs and enhancing the role of audit 
authority. In particular the ENI worded proposals 
and made some of them, about the governance 
system, public analyzing the foreign best practices. 
The proposals about board of directors, its strategic 
role, its configuration, its requirements for its 
members and the principles of conduct that regulate 
its task. 
Between the main pursued objectives: the 
strengthening of the strategic role of the board of 
directors and the introduction of the managerial 
experience as a central requirement of the 
administrators professionalism and of the staggered 
board, in order to promote  the stability and the 
continuity of management. It is clear that these 
proposals assume business scale in that the 
authorities is exercised by a professional managers. 
Another set of observations concerns the 
composition and duties of the various Committees 
of the board of directors, always in order to an its 
more strategic role  and in order to a enhancement 
of audit tasks of the board of auditors. Among the 
proposals: the strengthening of the role of the 
Committee for the internal audit in the matter of risk 
management, the establishment of a committee for 
the Corporate Governance (authority present in 
different models adopted by national listed 
company), the periodic renewal of the Committees 
and the  rationalization of the functions of the 
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Committee for the internal audit and of the board of 
auditors in order to avoid them overlap. 
A last group of proposals concerns the assembly and 
aims to involve more the shareholders in the 
company life and to improve them information. In 
particular for the Assembly are hoped, among other, 
rules that simplify the procedures and that allow the 
Assembly to focus about the issues of real interest 
for all shareholders and initiatives that promote the 
transparency of the voting policies of the 
institutional investors. 
The proposals above mentioned appear to be 
indicative of an evident dissatisfaction for the 
current order. One side, in fact, there is the 
requirement of saving and combining of tasks [15], 
the other an increasingly need of transparency and 
of professionalism in all company bodies. 
A unique common denominator: the traditional 
model. 
From the latter is necessary restart to make it 
compatible with the firm that, from time to time, 
must “dress up”.                                                     
The main limit of research derives from the absence 
of empirical evidence.  
In this direction, future research is aimed at provide 
empirical study of the role of the auditors starting 
from the italian listed companies, by finding 
implications for listed companies in the international 
scenario.  
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